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Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association: Oral Argument - November 02, 2010
 
01:00:51
Facts: Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective. Question: Does the First Amendment bar a state from restricting the sale of violent video games to minors? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection." Justice Samuel Alito concurred in judgment, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts. Alito noted that he disagreed "with the approach taken in the Court's opinion. In considering the application of unchanging constitutional principles to new and rapidly evolving technology, this Court should proceed with caution. We should make every effort to understand the new technology." Justices Clarence Thomas and Stephen Breyer filed separate dissents. Adhering to his strict understanding of the Framers' intent with the Constitution, Thomas wrote: "The Court's decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment." Breyer argued that the California statute met current constitutional standards. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1448 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:26:14 Section 3: 00:56:20 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro: Oral Argument - January 11, 2011
 
01:00:44
Facts: An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state. Question: May a consumer sue a foreign manufacturer in state court over a product that the foreign company marketed and sold in the United States? Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court in a plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Although the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent, the 'stream of commerce' metaphor carried the decision far afield," Kennedy wrote. "Due process protects the defendant's right not to be coerced except by lawful judicial power." Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Samuel Alito, concurred in the judgment, writing: "I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day consequences." Meanwhile, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. "Inconceivable as it may have seemed yesterday, the splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.'" For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1343 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:28:27 Section 3: 00:57:12 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Voisine v. United States: Oral Argument - February 29, 2016
 
52:41
Facts: In 2003 and 2005, Stephen Voisine was convicted of assaulting a woman (with whom he was in a domestic relationship) under a Maine state statute that establishes that a person is guilty of assault if that person “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.” A violation of that statute is misdemeanor domestic violence assault if the victim is a family or household member. In 2009, Voisine was arrested on the federal misdemeanor charge of killing a bald eagle. During the course of the investigation, police recovered a rifle from Voisine and, because of his earlier misdemeanor assault convictions, arrested and charged Voisine with violating a federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. William Armstrong III was convicted of assaulting his wife in violation of Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes in 2002 and 2008. In 2010, police searched the Armstrong residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia and discovered ammunition which was later linked to guns Armstrong had transported to a friend’s house. Armstrong was also charged with violating the federal statute that makes it a crime for a person convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence to possess a firearm. Voisine and Armstrong moved to dismiss the charges against them and argued that Maine’s misdemeanor domestic violence assault statutes do not constitute misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute because “recklessness” is sufficient for conviction under the Maine statute, but not the federal one. The district court denied the motions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which remanded the case in light of that Court’s decision in United States v. Castleman , which held that offensive touching satisfied the “physical force” requirement of the federal statute. On remand, the appellate court again held that Maine’s statute constituted misdemeanor domestic violence under the federal statute. Question: Does a misdemeanor crime that requires only a showing of recklessness qualify as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under federal statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-10154 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:28:53 Section 3: 00:50:46 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt: Oral Argument - March 02, 2016
 
01:25:04
Facts: In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 2 (H.B. 2), which contained several provisions related to abortions. One such provision required that any physician performing an abortion have admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion was performed, and another provision required that all abortion clinics comply with standards for ambulatory surgical centers. The petitioners are a group of abortion providers who sued the State of Texas seeking to invalidate those provisions in H.B. 2 as they relate to facilities in McAllen and El Paso. The petitioners argued that H.B. 2 denied equal protection, unlawfully delegated lawmaking authority, and constituted arbitrary and unreasonable state action. The district court dismissed the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and granted declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the two contested provisions of H.B. 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the the equal protection, unlawful delegation, and arbitrary and unreasonable state action claims and partially reversed the injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to show that they placed a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. Question: Should a court's "substantial burden" analysis take into account the extent to which laws that restrict access to abortion services actually serve the government's stated interest in promoting health? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-274 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:36 Section 3: 00:37:30 Section 4: 01:19:42 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Obergefell v. Hodges: Oral Argument - April 28, 2015 (Part 1)
 
01:30:34
Facts: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Question: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:27:40 Section 3: 00:34:08 Section 4: 00:34:30 Section 5: 00:41:39 Section 6: 01:27:28 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Riley v. California: Oral Argument - April 29, 2014
 
01:01:39
Facts: David Leon Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang of San Diego, California. On August 2, 2009, he and others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past them. The shooters then got into Riley's Oldsmobile and drove away. On August 22, 2009, the police pulled Riley over driving a different car; he was driving on expired license registration tags. Because Riley's driver's license was suspended, police policy required that the car be impounded. Before a car is impounded, police are required to perform an inventory search to confirm that the vehicle has all its components at the time of seizure, to protect against liability claims in the future, and to discover hidden contraband. During the search, police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was subsequently tied to the shooting on August 2 via ballistics tests, and separate charges were brought to include shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm. Before trial, Riley moved to suppress the evidence regarding his gang affiliation that had been acquired through his cell phone. His motion was denied. At trial, a gang expert testified to Riley's membership in the Lincoln Park gang, the rivalry between the gangs involved, and why the shooting could have been gang-related. The jury convicted Riley on all three counts and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, affirmed. Question: Was the evidence admitted at trial from Riley's cell phone discovered through a search that violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches? Conclusion: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-132 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:49 Section 3: 00:46:15 Section 4: 00:56:38 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Utah v. Strieff: Oral Argument - February 22, 2016
 
59:50
Facts: Utah Detective Douglas Fackrell received an anonymous tip about drug sales in a South Salt Lake residence, so he surveyed the area over a short period of time and speculated there was drug activity taking place. Fackrell saw Edward Joseph Strieff, Jr. leaving the residence and stopped him for questioning. During the stop, Fackrell discovered Strieff had an outstanding warrant and arrested him. During the lawful search after his arrest, Fackrell found methamphetamine and a drug pipe on Strieff’s person. The district court ruled that, although Fackrell did not have enough evidence to conduct an investigatory stop, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia obtained during the lawful search incident to arrest justified the admission of that evidence for trial. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, but the Utah Supreme Court reversed and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant that was the basis for the arrest was discovered during an unlawful investigatory stop. Question: Should evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest on an outstanding warrant be suppressed because the warrant was discovered during an investigatory stop later found to be unlawful? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1373 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:16:26 Section 3: 00:26:53 Section 4: 00:55:48 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Elonis v. United States: Oral Argument - December 01, 2014
 
01:03:46
Facts: Anthony Elonis was convicted under 18 U. S. C. §875(c), which criminalizes the transmission of threats in interstate commerce, for posting threats to injure his coworkers, his wife, the police, a kindergarten class, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent on Facebook. The district court instructed the jury that a "true threat," which falls outside the scope of First Amendment speech protections, requires an objective intent to threaten. Elonis appealed and argued that "true threats" require a subjective intent to threaten. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Elonis' conviction and held that a subjective intent standard would fail to protect individuals from the fear of violence which the "true threat" exception was created to prevent. Question: Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. §875(c) require proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten? Conclusion: Yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten . An objective reasonable person standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts. The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he agreed that the prosecution only needed to prove negligence, but he argued that the majority opinion should have addressed what the proper instruction should be. By leaving out what the prosecution did need to show, attorneys and judges are left to guess whether knowledge or recklessness is the appropriate standard. Justice Alito also argued that recklessness should be the standard because a higher standard would effectively change the law rather than clarify it. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that nine of the eleven circuit courts of appeals had already addressed this issue and resolved it with a general intent standard. The majority opinion not only overturns their rulings but also leaves the courts uncertain as to whether an intent to threaten is required or whether recklessness will suffice. Justice Thomas also argued that knowledge of posting the relevant threats is enough to establish the intent element because knowledge of those facts is required to make the actions illegal; ignorance of those actions being illegal should not provide shelter from the law. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-983 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:27:02 Section 3: 00:57:56 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Oral Argument - February 24, 2016
 
01:02:03
Facts: The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935 to regulate interstate electricity sales. The FPA vested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with authority over the transmission of electrical energy in interstate commerce and the wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce. To this end, FERC has created regional transmission organizations, such as PJM Interconnection, LLC, (PJM) which regulates a large regional market that includes Maryland and the District of Columbia. Maryland became concerned that FERC actions were failing to adequately incentivize the construction of new plants, so the Maryland Public Service Commission began soliciting proposals for the construction of a new plant and instituted a Generation Order to regulate how the company that won the bid would interact with the rest of the energy market. Commercial Power Ventures Maryland, LLC, (CPV) won the bid. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, (PPL) and other existing power plants sued and argued that the Generation Order unconstitutionally interfered with the PJM-regulated market. The district court held that the Generation Order was preempted by the federal regulation of the energy markets pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. This case was consolidated with CPV’s suit against PPL and the other existing power plants. Question: Does the Federal Power Act preempt attempted state regulation of utility contracts and sales? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-614 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:14:59 Section 3: 00:28:16 Section 4: 00:48:35 Section 5: 00:58:55 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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United States v. Jones: Oral Argument - November 08, 2011
 
01:03:49
Facts: Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant. Question: Did the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment but criticized the framing of the question in terms of trespass to property. He believed that such a construction of the problem strained the language of the Fourth Amendment and that it would be better to analyze the case by determining whether the Government violated Jones' reasonable expectations of privacy. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1259 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:27:49 Section 3: 00:58:12 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.: Oral Argument - March 21, 2017
 
01:02:15
Facts: Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) owns many patents for its printer toner cartridges. The customers who buy Lexmark’s cartridges may choose a cartridge subject to a “Return Program,” which is a combination single-use patent and contract license, and those who purchase the Return Program are given a discount on the cartridge in exchange for agreeing to use the cartridge once and then return the empty cartridge to Lexmark. Otherwise, customers may choose  a cartridge free of restrictions on its use. Some of Lexmark’s cartridges sold abroad and all of the domestically-sold cartridges at issue were subject to both a discount and the Return Program. Impression Products, Inc. (Impression) acquired the cartridges at issue after a third party physically changed the cartridges to enable re-use in violation of the single-use Return Program. Then, Impression Products acquired the cartridges abroad and resold them in the United States. Lexmark sued Impression and alleged that Impression infringed on Lexmark’s patents because Impression Products acted without authorization from Lexmark to resell and reuse the cartridges. Impression argued that, under the doctrine of exhaustion, Impression’s resale of the cartridges is non-infringing because Lexmark, in transferring the title by selling the cartridges initially, granted the requisite authority. The district court granted Impression’s motion to dismiss as it related to the domestically sold cartridges and held that the patent-holder’s rights were exhausted when the initial sale was authorized and unrestricted. The motion was denied as it related to the foreign-sold cartridges, however. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part by holding that Lexmark’s sale did not “confer authority” to Impression to resell without infringing on the patent. The appellate court also held that Lexmark’s foreign sales did not confer authority to import, sell, or use the cartridges, and it did not waive Lexmark’s rights to its patent. Question: Does a “conditional sale” that transfers title with post-sale restrictions on the use or resale of the item avoids the patent exhaustion doctrine and therefore permit the enforcement of the post-sale restrictions by suing for infringement?   In light of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., which held that copyrighted work lawfully made abroad is subject to the same post-sale restrictions as work made domestically, does the sale of a patented article abroad exhaust the U.S. patent rights in that article? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1189 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:21:24 Section 3: 00:31:44 Section 4: 00:59:29 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Birchfield v. North Dakota: Oral Argument - April 20, 2016
 
01:11:35
Facts: Danny Birchfield drove into a ditch in Morton County, North Dakota. When police arrived on the scene, they believed Birchfield was intoxicated. Birchfield failed both the field sobriety tests and the breath test. He was arrested, but he refused to consent to a chemical test. Birchfield was charged with a misdemeanor for refusing to consent to a chemical test in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the charge and claimed that the state law violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In a similar case, police were called to the South St. Paul boat launch where three men were attempting to pull their boat out of the water and onto their truck. William Robert Bernard, Jr., admitted he had been drinking and had the truck keys in his hands, but he denied driving the truck and refused to perform a field sobriety test. He was arrested on suspicion of driving while impaired (DWI) and taken to the police station, where he refused to consent to a chemical test in violation of Minnesota state law. Bernard was charged with two counts of first-degree test refusal pursuant to state law. In a separate incident, Steve Beylund consented to a blood alcohol to test to confirm he was driving under the influence after being informed it was a criminal offense in North Dakota to refuse a blood alcohol test. The test confirmed he was over the legal limit, and Beylund was charged with driving under the influence. All three men challenged the state statutes criminalizing refusal to submit to a chemical test and argued that the statutes violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when there was no probable cause that would support a warrant for the test. Both the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that criminalizing the refusal to submit to a chemical test was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Question: In the absence of a warrant, may a state statute criminalize an individual’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-1468 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:32:02 Section 3: 00:47:38 Section 4: 00:57:53 Section 5: 01:08:21 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Fisher v. University of Texas: Oral Argument - December 09, 2015
 
01:35:48
Facts: Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. She did not qualify for Texas' Top Ten Percent Plan, which guarantees admission to the top ten percent of every in-state graduating high school class. For the remaining spots, the university considers many factors, including race. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court, which held that the appellate court erred by not applying the strict scrutiny standard to the University’s admission policies. The case was remanded, and the appellate court reaffirmed the lower court’s decision by holding that the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process was sufficiently narrowly tailored to the legitimate interest of promoting educational diversity and therefore satisfied strict scrutiny. Question: Does the University of Texas’ use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:38:51 Section 3: 01:09:25 Section 4: 01:28:58 Section 5: 01:35:31 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Lee v. Tam: Oral Argument - January 18, 2017
 
56:43
Facts: Simon Tam and his band, The Slants, sought to register the band’s name with the U.S. Trademark Office. The Office denied the application because it found that the name  would likely be disparaging towards “persons of Asian descent.” The office cited the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act of 1946, which prohibits trademarks that “[consist] of or [comprise] immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.” Tam appealed the trademark officer’s decision, and the name was refused a second time by a board comprised of members of the office. Tam appealed to a panel of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the trademark officials were within their rights to refuse the trademark application under the Disparagement Clause. The appellate court then reviewed the case en banc and found that the trademark office was incorrect in refusing the trademark application and that the Disparagement Clause violated the First Amendment. Question: Is the Disparagement Clause invalid under the First Amendment? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1293 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:28:08 Section 3: 00:53:46 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado: Oral Argument - October 11, 2016
 
59:26
Facts: Miguel Angel Pena-Rodriguez was convicted of unlawful sexual conduct and harassment in state trial court. After the entry of a guilty verdict, two jurors informed Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel that one of the other jurors made racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez and the alibi witness during jury deliberations. The trial court authorized Pena-Rodriguez’s counsel to contact the two jurors for their affidavits explaining what the “biased” juror said about Pena-Rodriguez or his alibi witness. Based on these affidavits, which related racially biased statements about Pena-Rodriguez’s likely guilt and the alibi witness’ lack of credibility because both were Hispanic, Pena-Rodriguez moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Colorado held the jurors’ affidavits were inadmissible under Rule 606(b) of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence, which prohibits juror testimony on any matter occurring during the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court of Colorado also held Rule 606(b) did not violate Pena-Rodriguez’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because Pena-Rodriguez had waived that right by failing to adequately question jurors about their racial bias during voir dire. Question: May Rule 606(b) of Colorado's Rules of Evidence bar evidence of racial bias offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-606 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:36 Section 3: 00:44:02 Section 4: 00:54:14 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Arizona v. United States: Oral Argument - April 25, 2012
 
01:20:46
Facts: On April 23, 2010, the Arizona State Legislature passed S.B. 1070; Governor Jan Brewer signed the bill into law. On July 6, 2010, the United States sought to stop the enforcement of S.B. 1070 in federal district court before the law could take effect. The district court did not enjoin the entire act, but it did enjoin four provisions. The court enjoined provisions that (1) created a state-law crime for being unlawfully present in the United States, (2) created a state-law crime for working or seeking work while not authorized to do so, (3) required state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of anyone who was lawfully arrested or detained, and (4) authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States. Arizona appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the United States had shown that federal law likely preempted: (a) the creation of a state-crime for violation of federal registration laws, (b) the creation of a state-crime for work by unauthorized aliens, (c) the requirement to verify citizenship of all detained persons, and (d) the authorization for police officers to effect warrantless arrests based on probable cause of removability from the United States. Arizona appealed the court's decision. Question: Do the federal immigration laws preclude Arizona's efforts at cooperative law enforcement and preempt the four provisions of S.B. 1070 on their face? Conclusion: Yes for provisions 1, 2, and 4; No for provision 3. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 5-3 majority, reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Supreme Court held that provision 1 conflicts with the federal alien registration requirements and enforcement provisions already in place. Provision 2 is preempted because its method of enforcement interferes with the careful balance Congress struck with federal laws on unauthorized employment of aliens. Provision 4 is preempted because it usurps the federal government's authority to use discretion in the removal process. This creates an obstacle to carrying out the purposes and objectives of federal immigration laws. The Court upheld provision 3 as constitutional on its face. This provision merely allows state law enforcement officials to communicate with the federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement office during otherwise lawful arrests. The provision has three limitations that protect individual rights: a detainee is presumed not to be an illegal alien if he/she produces a valid Arizona drivers license; an officer may not consider race, color, or national origin during a check; and the check must be implemented in a manner consistent with federal law. Justice Kennedy noted that this decision did not foreclose any future constitutional challenges to the law on an as applied basis. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, writing that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that the Arizona statute does not conflict with federal law, but enforces federal immigration restrictions more effectively. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with Justice Scalia that all four provisions are constitutional. He argued that there is no conflict between the ordinary meaning of the federal laws and the Arizona statute. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority on provisions 1 and 3, but disagreeing on 2 and 4. Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision in the case. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-182 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:32:07 Section 3: 01:15:03 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Shelby County v. Holder: Oral Argument - February 27, 2013
 
01:16:22
Facts: The Fourteenth Amendment protects every person's right to due process of law. The Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied due to "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The Tenth Amendment reserves all rights not expressly granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50% turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change "neither has the purpose nor will have the effect" of negatively impacting any individual's right to vote based on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the issue of voting discrimination. Question: Does the renewal of Section 5 of the Voter Rights Act under the constraints of Section 4(b) exceed Congress' authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and therefore violate the Tenth Amendment and Article Four of the Constitution? Conclusion: Yes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining whether changes to a state's voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the voting turnout gap in the states in question. In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional in addition to Section 4. He wrote that the blatant discrimination against certain voters that Section 5 was intended to prohibit is no longer evident. Without such extraordinary circumstances, Congress cannot constitutionally justify placing the burden of Section 5 on the states in question. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments encompasses legislative action such as the Voting Rights Act. The legislative history and text of the Amendments as well as previous judicial precedent support Congress' authority to enact legislation that specifically targets potential state abuses. However, Congress does not have unlimited authority but must show that the means taken rationally advance a legitimate objective, as is the case with the Voting Rights Act. The evidence Congress gathered to determine whether to renew the Voting Rights Act sufficiently proved that there was still a current need to justify the burdens placed on the states in question. She also argued that, by holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the majority's opinion makes it impossible to effectively enforce Section 5. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:32:04 Section 3: 00:58:33 Section 4: 01:09:56 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Miller v. Alabama: Oral Argument - March 20, 2012
 
59:59
Facts: In July 2003, Evan Miller, along with Colby Smith, killed Cole Cannon by beating Cannon with a baseball bat and burning Cannon's trailer while Cannon was inside. Miller was 14 years old at the time. In 2004, Miller was transferred from the Lawrence County Juvenile Court to Lawrence County Circuit Court to be tried as an adult for capital murder during the course of an arson. In 2006, a grand jury indicted Miller. At trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court sentenced Miller to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller filed a post trial motion for a new trial, arguing that sentencing a 14-year-old to life without the possibility of parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied Miller's petition for writ of certiorari. In the companion case, petitioner Kuntrell Jackson, along with Derrick Shields and Travis Booker, robbed a local movie store in Blytheville, Arkansas in November, 1999. The three boys were 14 years old at the time. While walking to the store, Jackson discovered that Shields was hiding a shotgun in his coat. During the robbery, Shields shot the store clerk and the three boys fled the scene. Jackson was tried and convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery in July, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jackson to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In January 2008, Jackson filed a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus in circuit court. He argued that his sentence was unusual and excessive, violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The circuit court dismissed the petition and Jackson appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the lower court's decision. Question: Does the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a fourteen-year-old child violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment? Conclusion: Yes. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Elena Kagan reversed the Arkansas and Alabama Supreme Courts' decisions and remanded. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment forbids the mandatory sentencing of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes. While a mandatory life sentence for adults does not violate the Eighth Amendment, such a sentence would be an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment for children. Justice Stephen G. Breyer filed a concurring opinion. He argued for an additional determination that the offender actually killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. Without such a determination, the State could not pursue a mandatory life sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. filed a dissenting opinion. He reasoned that the Court's role is to apply the law, not to answer questions about morality and social policy. The majority did not sufficiently characterize the punishment as unusual, therefore the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-9646 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:50 Section 3: 00:54:56 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils: Oral Argument - March 01, 2017
 
52:09
Facts: Jodie Nevils was a federal employee with a Coventry Health Care of Missouri (Coventry) health insurance plan that was governed by the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), which expressly preempts state laws and regulations governing health insurance and benefits plans. After Nevils was awarded a settlement in a personal injury case, Coventry enforced a claim to the settlement money. Nevils sued Coventry and argued that Missouri law prevented insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and held that the FEHBA preempted state law regarding insurance companies’ claims to the proceeds of personal injury settlement. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that the FEHBA did not preempt state law in this case because an insurance company’s claim to a personal injury settlement does not clearly relate to “the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits.”   After the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision, the Office of Personnel Management created a new formal rule. That rule stated that an insurance carrier’s rights and responsibilities with respect to the settlement of an individual covered by that insurance carrier’s plan “relate to the nature, provision, and extent of coverage or benefits” for the purpose of the FEHBA. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for this case and vacated and remanded the lower court’s decision for reconsideration in light of this new rule. On remand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that there is no precedent that establishes that a federal agency’s interpretation of a preemption clause receives judicial deference. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Missouri again determined that the FEHBA did not preempt Missouri state law. Question: Does the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) preempt state laws that prohibit insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements pursuant to their contracts? Does the express preemption clause of the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion: The Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) preempts state laws that prohibit insurance companies from claiming the proceeds of personal injury settlements pursuant to their contracts, and the express preemption clause of the FEHBA does not violate the Supremacy Clause. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the relevant contractual provisions “relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits,” including with respect to the payment of benefits, under the language of the FEHBA. Because the contractual provisions at issue grant the insurance carriers rights to payments in exchange for the benefits they provide, they clearly fall within the language of the statute. The Court also held that Congress used the language “relate to,” which has traditionally been interpreted broadly with respect to federal preemption of state laws. The statutory context and purpose, along with the significant federal interests at stake, also support this interpretation. Because the federal statute--not the contract at issue--overrides the state law, the Court determined that this scheme did not violate the Supremacy Clause. In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a statute that conferred an executive agency the power to create contracts that preempt state law might be an unconstitutional grant of power to the Executive Branch. However, because Nevils did not make that argument, the Court did not address it. Justice Gorsuch did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-149 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:17:29 Section 3: 00:22:50 Section 4: 00:48:49 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Missouri v. McNeely: Oral Argument - January 09, 2013
 
01:00:59
Facts: On October 3, 2010, Missouri state police officer Mark Winder saw Tyler McNeely driving above the speed limit. When Winder followed McNeely to pull him over, he saw McNeely cross the center line three times. Upon making contact with McNeely, Wilder observed that his eyes were red and glassy, and that his breath smelled like alcohol. McNeely performed poorly on four field sobriety tests and refused to submit to a portable breath test. Wilder arrested McNeely for driving while intoxicated and transported him to a hospital to obtain a blood sample. Wilder read McNeely the Missouri Implied Consent statement, and McNeely still refused to submit the sample. Wilder ordered the sample taken anyway, and the blood test revealed McNeely's blood alcohol level was far above the legal limit. The state charged McNeely with driving while intoxicated, and McNeely moved to suppress the evidence of the blood sample because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. The state appealed and argued that the risk of McNeely's blood alcohol level decreasing over time represented an exigent circumstance requiring a blood draw. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred, but that the case represented a departure from current case law; it transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the trial court's decision. Question: Does the Fourth Amendment prevent the taking of a warrantless blood sample under exigent circumstances? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the 5-4 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless searches applies to blood alcohol tests unless specific exigent circumstances exist. Because each case must be considered based on its individual facts, there are cases in which the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood would be considered an exigent circumstance, but there is no reason to create a categorical rule. The Court also held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against bodily intrusions outweighs the state’s interest in gaining evidence quickly. In his partial concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the case in question does not provide the basis for any categorical rule on the issue of conducting a blood alcohol test without a warrant. He also wrote that the Fourth Amendment does not allow the warrant requirement to be entirely ignored in drunk driving arrests. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that there must be a categorical rule on this issue to provide appropriate guidance to law enforcement officials. He argued that exigent circumstances exist and justify a warrantless blood test if the officer believes there is not sufficient time to obtain a warrant before critical evidence is lost through natural metabolic processes. If there is time to secure a warrant, the officer must do so. Justice Stephen G. Breyer and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the body’s natural metabolization of alcohol constitutes an the destruction of evidence and represents an exigent circumstance. The importance of obtaining evidence allows the police to conduct a warrantless blood alcohol test without violating the Fourth Amendment. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1425 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:14:06 Section 3: 00:29:36 Section 4: 00:59:52 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics: Oral Argument - April 15, 2013
 
01:07:20
Facts: The Association for Molecular Pathology along with several other medical associations, doctors and patients sued the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Myriad Genetics to challenge several patents related to human genetics. The patents cover the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and certain mutations that indicate a high risk of developing breast cancer. The suit also challenged several method patents covering diagnostic screening for the genes. Myriad argued that once a gene is isolated, and therefore distinguishable from other genes, it could be patented. By patenting the genes, Myriad had exclusive control over diagnostic testing and further scientific research for the BRCA genes. Petitioners argued that patenting those genes violated §101 the Patent Act because they were products of nature. They also argued that the patents limit scientific progress. §101 limits patents to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." The district court granted summary judgment in favor of petitioners, holding that isolating a gene does not alter its naturally occurring fundamental qualities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that isolated genes are chemically distinct from their natural state in the human body. In March 2012, Petitioners sought certiorari; the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Mayo Collective Services v. Prometheus Laboratories . On remand, the Federal Circuit again upheld the patentability of the BRCA genes. Question: Does §101 of the Patent Act allow patents on human genes? Conclusion: Yes and no. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that naturally occurring gene sequences, and their natural derivative products, are not patent eligible. Under §101 of the Patent Act, the discovery of natural products does not warrant a patent. However, the Court also held that the creation of a new product in a lab exempts that product from being a product of nature. Therefore, gene sequences refined by synthetic processes to create molecules that do not occur naturally are patent eligible. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-398 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:22:22 Section 3: 00:33:02 Section 4: 01:03:20 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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County of Los Angeles v. Mendez: Oral Argument - March 22, 2017
 
01:00:07
Facts: In October 2010, Deputies Christopher Conley and Jennifer Pederson of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded to a tip from an informant that wanted parolee Ronnie O’Dell had been seen in front of the nearby residence of Paula Hughes. The officers were informed that Angel Mendez and Jennifer Lynn Garcia lived together in the backyard of the Hughes residence. Although they did not have a search warrant, other officers directed Deputies Conley and Pederson to search the backyard. After determining that O’Dell was not in any of the three storage sheds in Hughes’ backyard, the deputies proceeded to a wooden shed surrounded by an A/C unit, clothes locker, clothes, and other belongings. The deputies did not knock and announce their presence. Deputy Conley, upon opening the door, saw the silhouette of a person holding a rifle through a curtain in the shed. Conley yelled “Gun!” and both deputies proceeded to shoot Mendez and Garcia. Whether Mendez was merely moving the gun or was pointing it at the deputies was subject to conflicting testimony at trial. As a result, Mendez required amputation of his right leg below the knee, and Garcia was shot in the back.   Mendez and Garcia sued Conley and Pederson and alleged that the deputies, in their official capacity, deprived them of their Fourth Amendment rights by performing an unjustified warrantless search and that the deputies failed to adhere to the knock-and-announce rule, which requires that officers announce their presence before they enter a home. The district court found for the plaintiffs on both these allegations and also held that, although the officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances, they were liable for the shooting under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule. That rule holds an officer liable for use of deadly force where the officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation via a Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s determination that the search violated the Fourth Amendment but reversed the knock-and-announce rule holding that because there was no controlling Ninth Circuit precedent on whether officers must announce themselves again at a separate residence on the same property.  The appellate court also held that the officers were liable under the provocation rule because their unjustified search of the occupied shed led to the shooting. Question: May an officer be found liable under the Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule where it is determined that the officer’s use of force was reasonable and not excessive Does an incident which leads to a reasonable use of force negate a prior Fourth Amendment unlawful entry violation? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/16-369 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:16:06 Section 3: 00:28:03 Section 4: 00:55:34 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius: Oral Argument - March 26, 2012 (Part 1)
 
01:29:38
Facts: Check out Oyez's deep-dive into the background of the Affordable Care Act cases. Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay. The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees. Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown. The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty. The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision. The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit. The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA. Question: Is the suit brought by respondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 2 U.S.C. 7421(a)? Does Congress have power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, specifically under the Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause, to require most Americans to purchase health insurance? Is the individual mandate severable from the ACA? Did Congress exceed its enumerated powers and violate principles of federalism when it pressured States into accepting conditions that Congress could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal funding under Medicaid, the single largest grant-in-aid program? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:35:36 Section 3: 01:03:59 Section 4: 01:24:37 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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United States v. Texas: Oral Argument - April 18, 2016
 
01:32:20
Facts: In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, along with criteria for determining when prosecutors can choose not to enforce immigration laws under DACA. People who qualify for DACA may apply for work authorization. In 2014, DHS established a similar process for parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents as well as expanding DACA by making more people eligible. The new program was known as the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program. Texas and other states sued to prevent the implementation of DAPA and argued that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it had not gone through the notice-and-comment process, and because it was arbitrary and capricious. The states also argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, which clarifies the President's power. The district court held that the states had standing to file the suit and temporarily enjoined the implementation of DAPA because the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the notice-and-comment claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the states had standing as well as a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive and procedural claims. Question: Do states that provide subsidies to persons who are granted deferred action have standing to sue because the new guidelines will lead to more persons being eligible for deferred action? Is the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program arbitrary and capricious? Did DAPA violate the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to go through the notice-and-comment procedure? Does DAPA violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-674 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:30:33 Section 3: 00:40:47 Section 4: 01:11:53 Section 5: 01:27:00 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores: Oral Argument - March 25, 2014
 
01:28:35
Facts: The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over 500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Question: Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the religious objections of the company's owners? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-354 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:41:30 Section 3: 01:23:54 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.: Oral Argument - April 25, 2011
 
56:29
Facts: A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order. Question: In a securities fraud action, must plaintiffs prove that the alleged fraud caused a drop in stock prices in order to get class certification? Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts. "Securities fraud plaintiffs need not prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification," the Chief Justice wrote. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1403 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:15:44 Section 3: 00:26:04 Section 4: 00:51:23 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Rodriguez v. United States: Oral Argument - January 21, 2015
 
01:00:33
Facts: On March 27, 2012, a Nebraska K-9 police officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Dennys Rodriguez after his vehicle veered onto the shoulder of the highway. The officer issued a written warning and then asked if he could walk the K-9 dog around Rodriguez's vehicle. Rodriguez refused, but the officer instructed him to exit the vehicle and then walked the dog around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and a large bag of methamphetamine was found. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence found in the search, claiming the dog search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding the search was constitutional because the brief delay before employing the dog did not unreasonably prolong the otherwise lawful stop. Question: Is the use of a K-9 unit, after the conclusion of a traffic stop and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the use of a K-9 unit after the completion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop exceeded the time reasonably required to handle the matter and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the mission of the stop determines its allowable duration, the authority for the stop ends when the mission has been accomplished. The Court held that a seizure unrelated to the reason for the stop is lawful only so long as it does not measurably extend the stop’s duration. Although the use of a K-9 unit may cause only a small extension of the stop, it is not fairly characterized as connected to the mission of an ordinary traffic stop and is therefore unlawful. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the use of a K-9 unit at the conclusion of an otherwise lawful traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as it was conducted reasonably, which this one was. Justice Thomas also argued that the rule announced in the majority’s opinion would result in arbitrary enforcement of Fourth Amendment protections and created artificial lines between common police practices at traffic stops. Additionally, there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case because the police officer had a reasonable suspicion to continue to hold Rodriguez and use the K-9 unit. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy noted that the appellate court did not address the issue of whether the officer had a reasonable suspicion to use the K-9 unit, and that court should be allowed to do so. Justice Alito also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority opinion’s analysis was arbitrary because it relied on the order in which the officer conducted his inquiries. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-9972 Section 1: 00:00:05 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Foster v. Chatman: Oral Argument - November 02, 2015
 
01:01:04
Facts: In 1986, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an 18-year-old black man, was charged with murdering Queen White, an elderly white woman. At the trial, the prosecution used peremptory strikes against all four of the qualified black jurors. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky , which prohibits the use of peremptory strikes on the basis of race, the defense objected to those strikes, and the burden shifted to the prosecution to prove that there were race-neutral explanation for the strikes. The prosecution provided reasons, and the trial court held that the reasons were sufficient. An all-white jury convicted Foster of murder and imposed the death penalty. Foster filed a motion for post-judgment discovery regarding the prosecution’s notes during jury selection and a motion for a new trial, both of which the trial court denied. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decisions, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Foster  petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Butts County Superior Court and submitted a new Batson challenge based on the prosecutor's notes obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act. The court denied Foster's petition. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the writ. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.  Question: Was there race-based discrimination of the type Batson v. Kentucky prohibits in the jury selection process of Foster’s trial? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-8349 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:28:02 Section 3: 00:58:18 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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United States v. Alvarez: Oral Argument - February 22, 2012
 
59:33
Facts: On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces. The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal. Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision. Question: Does 18 U.S.C. 704(b), the Stolen Valor Act, violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, affirmed the Court of Appeals. Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny and are almost always invalid, except in rare and extreme circumstances. While categories of speech, such as defamation and true threats, present a grave and imminent threat, false statements alone do not present such a threat. Congress drafted the Stolen Valor Act too broadly, attempting to limit speech that could cause no harm. Criminal punishment for such speech is improper. Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred, concluding that false statements of fact should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. However, as drafted, the Stolen Valor Act violates intermediate scrutiny because it applies to situations that are unlikely to cause harm. Justice Elena Kagan joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented. Congress could not draft the Stolen Valor Act more narrowly, while still preventing the substantial harm caused by false statements concerning military decoration. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-210 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:27:24 Section 3: 00:55:52 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Town of Greece v. Galloway: Oral Argument - November 06, 2013
 
01:00:36
Facts: The town of Greece, New York, is governed by a five-member town board that conducts official business at monthly public meetings. Starting in 1999, the town meetings began with a prayer given by an invited member of the local clergy. The town did not adopt any policy regarding who may lead the prayer or its content, but in practice, Christian clergy members delivered the vast majority of the prayers at the town's invitation. In 2007, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens complained about the town's prayer practices, after which there was some increase in the denominations represented. In February 2008, Galloway and Stephens sued the town and John Auberger, in his official capacity as Town Supervisor, and argued that the town's practices violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by preferring Christianity over other faiths. The district court found in favor of the town and held that the plaintiffs failed to present credible evidence that there was intentional seclusion of non-Christian faiths. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and held that the practices violated the Establishment Clause by showing a clear preference for Christian prayers. Question: Does the invocation of prayer at a legislative session violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment even in the absence of discrimination in the selection of prayer-givers and content? Conclusion: No. Justice Anthony Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the context and jurisprudence surrounding the First Amendment suggested that the Establishment Clause was never meant to prohibit legislative prayer, which created the proper deliberative mood and acknowledged religion's role in society. The content of this prayer does not need to be non-sectarian, because such a requirement would place the courts in the role of arbiters of religious speech, which would involve the government in religion to an extent that is impermissible under the Establishment Clause. The Court thus held that the prayers in question do not violate this tradition and are therefore acceptable under the First Amendment. Justice Kennedy further argued that legislative prayer is primarily for the members of the legislative body, and therefore such prayers do not coerce the public into religious observance. Though the respondents testified that they felt offended by these prayers, Justice Kennedy distinguished between offense and coercion and noted that the former does not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas did not join in this portion of the opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that there is a long tradition of constitutionally permissible legislative prayer and that such prayer need not be non-sectarian, especially when such a requirement would place the government in the position of policing prayer. Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the Establishment Clause should be read as a federalist provision that protected states' rights rather than individual rights. Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote a dissent in which he argued that, as the Court of Appeals held, the Town of Greece must do more to make its legislative prayer inclusive of other faiths. Despite the fact that the town is not exclusively Christian, the town made no significant effort to inform non-Christian clergy about the possibility of delivering an invocation, and in doing so, marginalized religious minority populations. Justice Elena Kagan wrote in a separate dissent that the town's failure to represent a variety of religions in its meetings amounted to the unconstitutional preference of one religion over others. To do so in a public forum where people come to participate in the political process forces individuals who do not agree with the beliefs represented in the prayer to either acquiesce or visibly make their dissent known. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and Justice Breyer joined in the dissent. " For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-696 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:17:38 Section 3: 00:27:58 Section 4: 00:57:30 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Jennings v. Rodriguez: Oral Argument - November 30, 2016
 
01:05:30
Facts: Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act require that noncitizens who are determined to be inadmissible to the United States must be detained during removal proceedings, though some may be released on bond if they can demonstrate that they are not a flight risk or a danger to the community. Alejandro Rodriguez and other detained noncitizens sued and argued that their prolonged detention without hearings and determinations to justify the detentions violated their due process rights. After litigation regarding class certification, the district court granted a preliminary injunction that required the government to provide each detainee with a bond hearing and to release that detainee unless the government could show, by clear and convincing evidence, that continued detention was justified. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that prolonged detention without a hearing raised serious constitutional concerns, and therefore that the relevant mandatory statutory language should be interpreted as having a time limitation; at the six-month mark, detainees are entitled to bond hearings. Because the plaintiff class proved that it was likely to succeed on the merits, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff class then moved for a permanent injunction, which the district court granted and the appellate court affirmed. The appellate court also determined that the duration of future detention and likelihood of eventual removal should not be considered in the bond hearings, and the noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings at six-month intervals throughout their detentions. Question: Are noncitizens who are subject to mandatory detention under the relevant text of the Immigration and Nationality Act entitled to bond hearings, with the possibility of release, if their detentions last six months? Are the noncitizens entitled to release unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizens are dangers to their communities and flight risks? Should the length of the noncitizen’s detention be weighed in favor of release, and should new bond hearings be provided automatically every six months? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1204 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:29:36 Section 3: 01:01:03 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Snyder v. Phelps: Oral Argument - October 06, 2010
 
01:01:09
Facts: The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words." Question: Does the First Amendment protect protesters at a funeral from liability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the family of the deceased? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision in an opinion by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The Court held that the First Amendment shields those who stage a protest at the funeral of a military service member from liability. Justice Stephen J. Breyer filed a concurring opinion in which he wrote that while he agreed with the majority's conclusion in the case, "I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point." Justice Samuel Alito filed a lone dissent, in which he argued: "Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case." For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-751 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:26:45 Section 3: 00:57:05 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Murr v. Wisconsin: Oral Argument - March 20, 2017
 
01:12:34
Facts: The parents of Joseph P. Murr and his siblings (the Murrs) purchased two adjacent lots (Lots E and F) in St. Croix County in 1960. The two lots together made up approximately .98 acres. In 1994 and 1995 respectively, the Murrs’ parents transferred Lot F and Lot E to their children. In 1995, the two lots were merged pursuant to St. Croix County’s code of ordinances. The relevant ordinance prohibits the individual development or sale of adjacent lots under common ownership, unless an individual lot was at least one acre. The ordinance further specified that if each lot is not at least one acre, the lots may be measured together to equal one acre. Seven years later, the Murrs wanted to sell Lot E and not Lot F. The St. Croix County Board of Adjustment denied the Murrs’ application to sell the lots separately. The Murrs sued the state and county and claimed the ordinance in question resulted in an uncompensated taking of their property and deprived them of “all, or practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or developed as a separate lot.” The circuit court granted summary judgement to the state and county. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed and held that the Murrs were not deprived of their practical use of the property. Question: In a regulatory taking case, should two legally distinct but commonly owned contiguous parcels be combined for takings analysis purposes? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-214 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:30:56 Section 3: 00:46:36 Section 4: 00:57:20 Section 5: 01:07:40 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Microsoft v. Baker: Oral Argument - March 21, 2017
 
01:01:14
Facts: The plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and alleged that, during regular game play on the Xbox 360, the discs would come loose due to vibrations and scratch against internal components of the gaming system, which rendered them permanently broken. Because only 0.4% of consoles caused this issue with regular players, the district court determined that a class action suit could not be certified and individuals in the suit would have to come forward on their own. The parties then stipulated a dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the dismissal, and the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appellate court reversed and held that the district court had misapplied applicable law and, therefore, abused its discretion in striking the class action allegations. Question: Does a federal court of appeals have the jurisdiction to review a class action suit for certification after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-457 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:24:46 Section 3: 00:54:58 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds: Oral Argument - November 05, 2012
 
59:56
Facts: Amgen, Inc. is an American pharmaceutical corporation. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two Amgen products that stimulate production of red blood cells and reduce the need for blood transfusions in anemic patients. Amgen allegedly made misrepresentations to the FDA about the safety of these products. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds brought an action against Amgen alleging four counts of misrepresentation. Connecticut Retirement Plans specifically alleged that Amgen misrepresented the nature of several FDA committee meetings to shareholders. It sought to certify a class of persons who purchased Amgen stock between April 22, 2004 and May 10, 2007, the dates when two of the meetings in question occurred. On May 10, 2007, Amgen's stock value dropped by more than nine percent. To certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, and that these questions predominate over questions affecting only individual members. Amgen opposed the class certification, arguing that the that the misrepresentations did not have any impact on the price of Amgen stock. The district court rejected Amgen's arguments and granted the class certification. The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed, rejecting Amgen's argument that a plaintiff must give proof that the misrepresentations were material at the class certification stage. Question: 1. Must the district court require proof of materiality before certifying a class action based on the fraud-upon-the-market theory in a misrepresentation case? 2. Must the district court allow Amgen, Inc. to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the fraud-upon-the-market theory before certifying the plaintiff class Conclusion: No, no. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that the issue of materiality is dealt with when the case is decided on the merits, not during class certification. For a class to be certified, the members of the class must show only that the questions they have in common predominate over questions affecting solely individual members of the class. The Supreme Court also held that the district court ruled appropriately in preventing Amgen from bringing in rebuttal evidence to prevent class certification. Such evidence dealt with material issues of the case that would be decided when the case was considered on the merits, and thus did not relate to the issue of class certification. In his concurring opinion, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that, while he joins the majority's opinion, recent economic evidence suggests that the fraud-on-the-market theory might rest on faulty economic presumptions that would be worth reexamining. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that a presumption of materiality was necessary for class certification in a fraud-on-the-market case. Because such a case is predicated on the idea that the members of the class relied on faulty information, there cannot be a suit without evidence that the faulty information was material. In his separate dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that plaintiffs seeking to use the fraud-on-the-market theory must show evidence of all aspects of the theory, including materiality, to be certified as a class. Without proof of materiality along with the other elements, there is no evidence that the claim has class-wide relevance. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-1085 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:28 Section 3: 00:44:11 Section 4: 00:54:22 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Florida v. Jardines: Oral Argument - October 31, 2012
 
01:01:59
Facts: On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified "crime stoppers" tip that the home of Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana. On December 6, 2006, two detectives, along with a trained drug detection dog, approached the residence. The dog handler accompanied the dog to the front door of the home. The dog signaled that it detected the scent of narcotics. The detective also personally smelled marijuana. The detective prepared an affidavit and applied for a search warrant, which was issued. A search confirmed that marijuana was being grown inside the home. Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking cannabis. Jardines moved to suppress the evidence seized at his home on the theory that the drug dog's sniff was an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment and that all subsequent evidence was fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently ruled to suppress the evidence. The state appealed the suppression ruling and the state appellate court reversed, concluding that no illegal search had occurred since the officer had the right to go up to the defendant's front door and that a warrant was not necessary for the drug dog's sniff. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and concluded that the dog's sniff was a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The state of Florida appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Question: Is a dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection dog a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered a 5-4 opinion affirming the Florida Supreme Court's decision. The Court held that the front porch of a home is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. Typically, ordinary citizens are invited to enter onto the porch, either explicitly or implicitly, to communicate with the house's occupants. Police officers, however, cannot go beyond the scope of that invitation. Entering a person's porch for the purposes of conducting a search requires a broader license than the one commonly given to the general public. Without such a license, the police officers were conducting an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that the case dealt with privacy issues as well as the property issues the majority opinion addressed. People have a heightened expectation of privacy in their homes and the areas immediately surrounding their homes, and in this case, the police violated that expectation. Because the police officers used a device (a drug-sniffing dog) not in public use to learn details about the home, Justice Kagan argued that an illegal search had been conducted. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined in the concurrence. Justice Samuel A. Alito dissented, arguing that the majority's interpretation of the public license to approach a person's front door is too narrow and should extend even to police officers collecting evidence against an occupant. The dissent argued that the common law of trespass does not limit the public license to a particular category of visitors approaching the door for a specific purpose. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-564 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:17:35 Section 3: 00:27:53 Section 4: 00:58:29 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Obergefell v. Hodges: Oral Argument - April 28, 2015 (Part 2)
 
50:38
Facts: Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. Question: (1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? (2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:24:59 Section 3: 00:46:22 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Bond v. United States: Oral Argument - February 22, 2011
 
01:00:55
Facts: Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment. Question: Does a criminal defendant, who has been convicted under a federal statute, have standing to challenge the conviction on grounds that the statute is beyond the federal government's enumerated powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court order in a unanimous opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy. "Bond has standing to challenge the federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States," Kennedy wrote. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer in which she argued: "I join the Court's opinion and write separately to make the following observation. Bond, like any other defendant, has a personal right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law." For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1227 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:15:47 Section 3: 00:36:23 Section 4: 00:56:59 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman: Oral Argument - October 15, 2013
 
59:23
Facts: The workers and relatives of workers in the Gonzalez-Catan plant of Mercedes Benz Argentina, a wholly owned subsidiary of German-based DaimlerChrysler AG ("the company"), sued the company for violations of the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. They argued that, during Argentina's "Dirty War" of 1976-1983, the company sought to punish plant workers suspected of being union agitators and worked with the Argentinean military and police to do so by passing along information and allowing the plant to be raided. The plaintiffs also argued that the company stood to gain from these actions as they ended strikes and allowed the plant to continue operating at maximum production levels. The plaintiffs sued the company in district court in California, where some of the company's major subsidiaries are located under the Alien Torts Act, and the company moved for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for dismissal and held that the company did not have enough contacts in California to warrant a California court exercising jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision and held that it is reasonable for a California court to have jurisdiction over a multinational company that is capable of litigating the case regardless of the location and has pervasive business contacts in the state. Question: Can a court exercise jurisdiction over a foreign company based on the fact that a subsidiary of the company acts on its behalf in the forum state? Conclusion: No. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the company's slim contacts in California, relative to its other national and international contacts, are not sufficient to render it "at home" in the state for the purpose of general jurisdiction. Because the company had so little connection to California and this suit had nothing to do with the company's conduct in the state, to allow the district court to adjudicate such a case would grant the courts essentially global reach as long as the foreign company in question did any business with the state. The Court also held that subjecting the company to this suit would not be in line with the "fair play and substantial justice" standard the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands. In her opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote that the majority opinion ignored due process and jurisdiction precedent by basing the decision on the company's contacts outside the state rather than inside. She argued that such a case should be decided based solely on whether a company has sufficient contacts within the state to establish jurisdiction, without considering those contacts in relation to a larger company presence. Because this case dealt with foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign company for actions committed abroad, California jurisdiction should be considered unreasonable without the analysis of the majority opinion. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/11-965 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:16:55 Section 3: 00:27:45 Section 4: 00:55:29 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar: Oral Argument - April 19, 2016
 
01:00:42
Facts: Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS) owns and operates Arbour Counseling Services (Arbour), a mental health services provider in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Arbour participates in the state Medicaid program, MassHealth, and the state has promulgated regulations for such “satellite” facilities. Julio Escobar and Carmen Correa are the parents of Yarushka Rivera, a teenager with behavioral issues who began seeing a counselor at Arbour. These counselors were not licensed, and Escobar and Correa became concerned that they were not being properly supervised as the regulations of satellite facilities required. Rivera was eventually diagnosed with bipolar disorder and prescribed a medicine by a “doctor” who was later discovered to be a nurse under the supervision of a non-board-certified psychiatrist. Rivera soon had an adverse reaction to the medicine and called Arbour for guidance but was unable to speak with anyone. A few days later, she had a seizure and was hospitalized. A few months later, she suffered a fatal seizure. Escobar and Correa filed complaints with several state agencies and eventually sued UHS under both the federal and state False Claims Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint and held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead the elements of falsity that claims under the False Claims Act require. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the elements of falsity by applying an “implied certification” test, which states that falsity has been sufficiently pled when there is evidence that the defendant did not comply with a condition of payment. Question: (1) Is the implied certification test for determining when claims have sufficiently pled falsity for the purposes of the False Claims Act valid? (2) If so, does the relevant statute need to explicitly state the conditions of payment with which the defendant allegedly failed to comply? For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/15-7 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:22:15 Section 3: 00:37:30 Section 4: 00:52:39 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Michigan v. Bryant: Oral Argument - October 05, 2010
 
01:02:13
Facts: A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the statements were "testimonial" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death. Question: Are inquiries of wounded victims concerning the perpetrator non-testimonial if they objectively indicate that the purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, and, thus, not afforded heightened protection under Crawford v. Washington ? Conclusion: Yes. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a majority opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The court held that the identification and description of the shooter and the location of the shooting were "not testimonial statements because they had a 'primary purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' Therefore, their admission at Bryant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause." Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority opinion for distorting "our confrontation clause jurisprudence and leav[ing] it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort." The majority, he continued, "creates an expansive exception to the confrontation clause for violent crimes." In a separate dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg agreed with Scalia, but observed a "well-established exception to the confrontation requirement: The cloak protecting the accused against admission of out-of-court testimonial statements was removed for dying declarations." Justice Elena Kagan took no part in the consideration of the case. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-150 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:18:32 Section 3: 00:29:16 Section 4: 00:59:41 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan: Oral Argument - April 27, 2011
 
58:09
Facts: Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan. The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission . ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority. Question: Does the First Amendment subject state restrictions on voting by elected officials to strict scrutiny? Conclusion: No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia. "The Nevada Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally overbroad," Scalia wrote for the unanimous court. Justice Anthony Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in which he noted: "the opinion does not, and on this record should not, consider a free speech contention that would have presented issues of considerable import, were it to have been a proper part of the case." Meanwhile, Justice Samuel Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, writing: "I concur in the judgment, but I do not agree with the opinion of the Court insofar as it suggests that restrictions upon legislators' voting are not restrictions upon legislators' speech." For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-568 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:32 Section 3: 00:52:52 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Reichle v. Howards: Oral Argument - March 21, 2012
 
59:38
Facts: On June 16, 2006, Steven Howards saw Vice President Dick Cheney while strolling through Beaver Creek Mall. Howards decided to approach the Vice President to protest the President's polices regarding the Iraq War. On that day, Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle were part of the Secret Service detail protecting the Vice President. Doyle heard Howards state into his cell phone "I'm going to ask him how many kids he's killed today." Howards approached the Vice President and told the Vice President that the he disapproved of his policies in Iraq. When the Vice President turned to leave, Howards made unsolicited physical contact with the Vice President by touching the Vice President's right shoulder with his open hand. Agent Reichle approached Howards, identified himself as a Secret Service agent, and asked to speak with Howards. After briefly questioning Howards, Reichle arrested him. Howards was initially charged with harassment under state law, but those charges were dismissed. No federal charges were filed. Howards sued agents Reichle and Doyle under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the agents had violated his Fourth Amendment right with an unlawful search and seizure and his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. The agents moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion, ruling that fact issues regarding the agents' immunity defense precluded summary judgment. The agents took an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they had probable cause to arrest Howards and also asserted that they were entitled to heightened immunity by virtue of their status as Secret Service agents protecting the Vice President. The appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel unanimously rejected Howards' Fourth Amendment claim on the grounds that the agents objectively had probable cause to arrest Howards. However, the panel held that probable cause was not a bar to Howards' First Amendment retaliation claim and that Howards could proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claim notwithstanding the fact that the agents had probable cause for his arrest. Question: 1. Does probable cause to make an arrest bar a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim? 2. Do Secret Service agents have qualified immunity in the matter of an arrest for which there was probable cause consistent with the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion: No answer and Yes. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the 10th Circuit and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the agents have qualified immunity from Howards' First Amendment claim because there is no clearly established right to protection from retaliatory arrest when there is probable cause for that arrest. For a right to be clearly established, every reasonable officer must understand that he or she is violating that right. The Court has never acknowledged the proposed right in this case, and 10th Circuit precedent is unclear. The Court did not decide whether there is, in fact, a right to protection from retaliatory arrests where there is otherwise probable cause for the arrest. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred, writing that she would not grant qualified immunity if the agents had been ordinary law enforcement officers. She would apply a different standard for officers charged with protecting public officials because they must make quick and decisive decisions to protect the safety of those officials. The agents' actions in this case were rational and should not expose them to civil damages. Justice Stephen H. Breyer joined in the concurrence. Justice Elena Kagan did not participate in the decision. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-262 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:15:24 Section 3: 00:30:46 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Sackett v. EPA: Oral Argument - January 09, 2012
 
01:01:34
Facts: Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition. The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an "any information available" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order. Question: Do landowners have a right to go to court to challenge a Clean Water Act order of the Environmental Protection Agency? Conclusion: Yes. In a 9-0 decision, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority opinion holding that the EPA's compliance order is a final agency action, and there is no other remedy for the Sackett's other than judicial review. Justice Scalia rejected each of the government's arguments that the Clean Water Act precluded judicial review of compliance orders. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurrence, noting that the Court ruled only on whether the Sackett's can seek review of the EPA's authority to regulate their land, not whether they can challenge the specific terms of the compliance order. Justice Samuel A. Alito also concurred, stating that judicial review of compliance is better than nothing, but the only real solution is a clarification by Congress of the ambiguities in the Clean Water Act . For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1062 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:25:43 Section 3: 00:56:13 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Bond v. United States: Oral Argument - November 05, 2013
 
01:00:40
Facts: Carol Anne Bond worked for the chemical manufacturer Rohm and Haas. When she learned that her friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant and that Bond's husband was the father, she used her connections with the chemical company to obtain the means for revenge. She stole and purchased highly toxic chemicals that she applied to Haynes' doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Haynes suffered a minor burn, and after contacting a federal investigator, Bond was identified as the perpetrator. She was charged with several violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (Act). In the district court, Bond moved to dismiss the case and argued that Congress did not have the authority to enforce the Act because it subverted states' rights in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Bond conditionally pled guilty with the understanding that she could continue to appeal the decision regarding the validity of the Act. She was sentenced to six years in prison. Bond renewed her challenge to the Act in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which held that Bond did not have standing to appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the case must be considered on its merits. The case was remanded back to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the Act was within Congress' power to enact and enforce. Question: (1) Does Congress have the authority to enact legislation that enforces a treaty but goes beyond the scope of the treaty and intrudes on traditional state prerogatives? (2) Can the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act be properly interpreted so that it does not apply to ordinary poisoning cases, which have been traditionally handled by state and local authorities? Conclusion: No, yes. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that federal law typically does not intrude on the ability of states to regulate local matters, and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is not an exception to that general rule. While Congress has the authority to create legislation to enforce treaties, it must do so while respecting the traditional division of sovereign responsibility between the federal government and the states. The Court also held that it is incumbent upon the courts to be sure of Congress' intent before ruling based on such a rationale; in this case, because there is no evidence that Congress intended the statute to have expansive powers, it must be read more narrowly. In fact, the language of the statute suggests that the facts of this case do not match the types of situations the statute was enacted to govern. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that, in determining whether the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act covers Bond's actions, the majority opinion overstepped its bounds and performed Congress' duty. Justice Scalia also wrote that it was clear from the wording of the statute that Bond's actions were covered, and the majority opinion's interpretation of the statute made it so broad as to be unintelligible. However, the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the rights of the states. Justice Clarence Thomas and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that, while Congress has the power to create laws that enforce treaties, that power does not extend to the enforcement of laws that would infringe on states' rights. The historical context of this "Treaty Power" indicates that it was meant to be limited to international affairs and not interfere with the constitutional structure of federal and state power. Justice Scalia and Justice Alito joined in the concurrence in judgment. Justice Alito also wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the statute went beyond Congress' power to enforce treaties and is therefore unconstitutional. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-158 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:26:31 Section 3: 00:56:28 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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J.D.B. v. North Carolina: Oral Argument - March 23, 2011
 
58:53
Facts: A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona , such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. Question: Should courts consider the age of a juvenile suspect in deciding whether he or she is in custody for Miranda purposes? Conclusion: Yes. A divided Supreme Court reversed the lower court order in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the state court to determine whether the youth was in custody when he was interrogated. (1966). "It is beyond dispute that children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave. Seeing no reason for police officers or courts to blind themselves to that commonsense reality, we hold that a child's age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis," Sotomayor wrote for the majority. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas. "The Court's decision in this case may seem on first consideration to be modest and sensible, but in truth it is neither, Alito writes. "It is fundamentally inconsistent with one of the main justifications for the Miranda rule: the perceived need for a clear rule that can be easily applied in all cases. And today's holding is not needed to protect the constitutional rights of minors who are questioned by the police." For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11121 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:27:03 Section 3: 00:46:54 Section 4: 00:57:06 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Alice Corporation v. CLS Bank International: Oral Argument - March 31, 2014
 
01:00:14
Facts: Alice Corporation (Alice) is an Australian company that owns the '479, '510, '720, and '375 patents, all of which have to do with a computerized trading platform that deals with financial transactions in which a third party settles obligations between two others so as to settlement eliminate risk. Settlement risk is the risk to each party in an exchange that only one party will pay its obligation. Alice's patents address that risk by using the third party as the guarantor. On May 24, 2007, CLS Bank International (CLS) sued Alice and sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity of the '479, '510, and '720 patents. Alice countersued and claimed infringement. CLS moved for summary judgment by arguing that any possible infringement could not have occurred in the United States and that Alice's claims were drawn from ineligible subject matter. Alice filed crossmotions, and the district court denied both motions. In the meantime, the '375 patent processed, and Alice amended its complaint to include this patent. Both parties renewed their crossmotions. For the purposes of these motions, the district court assumed that all asserted patent claims required electronic implementation and granted summary judgment in favor of CLS. The district court held that Alice's patents were invalid because they were directed at an abstract idea and that those claims could preempt the use of the abstract concept of a neutral intermediary to facilitate exchange and eliminate risk. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Question: Are claims regarding computer-implemented inventions—including systems, machines, processes, and items of manufacture—patent-eligible subject matter? Conclusion: No. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that patent law should not restrain abstract ideas that are the "building blocks of human ingenuity" and held all of Alice's claims ineligible for patent protection. Because using a third party to eliminate settlement risk is a fundamental and prevalent practice, it is essentially a building block of the modern economy. The Court held that Alice's claims did no more than require a generic computer to implement this abstract idea of intermediated settlement by performing generic computer functions, which is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Justice Sonia M. Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which she argued that any claim that merely describes a method of doing business should not be patentable. In this case, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the method claims at issue pertained to an abstract idea. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Stephen G. Breyer joined the concurrence. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/13-298 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:26:04 Section 3: 00:46:24 Section 4: 00:56:26 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.: Oral Argument - November 04, 2014
 
01:00:23
Facts: On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced their Eagan, Minnesota, home by borrowing $611,000 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. The Jesinoskis received a Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosure and a Notice of the Right to Cancel, which gave them until midnight on February 27, 2007, to rescind the loan. The Jesinoskis did not exercise their right to cancel the loan, and they used the money to pay off several consumer debts. On February 23, 2010, the Jesinoskis attempted to rescind the loan and argued that they did not receive sufficient copies of the TILA disclosure and the Notice of the Right to Cancel. After the request to rescind the loan was denied, the Jesinoskis sued Countrywide Home Loans for failure to rescind their loan on February 24, 2011. Countrywide Home Loans sought a judgment on the pleadings and argued that the Jesinoskis did not file their suit within the three-year time period allowed by TILA. The Jesinoskis argued that, because they attempted to rescind the loan within the three-year time period, their suit fulfills that requirement and should be allowed to proceed. The district court found in favor of Countrywide Home Loans; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question: Does the Truth in Lending Act allow a borrower to rescind a loan by notifying the creditor within the three-year time frame, even though a lawsuit has not yet been filed? Conclusion: Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. The Court held that the three-year period required by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is satisfied when the borrower notifies the lender of his intent to rescind the loan within that period, even if a lawsuit has not yet been filed. The plain language of TILA specifies that a borrower need only notify the creditor of his intent to rescind the loan; it does not require the borrower to file a lawsuit. Although common law recession traditionally requires the borrower to return what was borrowed (as would result from a lawsuit), modern jurisprudence does not require that a statute be interpreted as implementing its common law analog. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-684 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:15:49 Section 3: 00:24:45 Section 4: 00:55:11 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: Oral Argument - December 03, 2014
 
01:02:17
Facts: Peggy Young was employed as a delivery driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). In 2006, she requested a leave of absence in order to undergo in vitro fertilization. The procedure was successful and Young became pregnant. During her pregnancy, Young's medical practitioners advised her to not lift more than twenty pounds while working. UPS's employee policy requires their employees to be able to lift up to seventy pounds. Due to Young's inability to fulfill this work requirement, as well as the fact that she had used all her available family/medical leave, UPS forced Young to take an extended, unpaid leave of absence. During this time she eventually lost her medical coverage. Young gave birth in April 2007 and resumed working at UPS thereafter. Young sued UPS and claimed she had been the victim of gender-and disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS moved for summary judgment and argued that Young could not show that UPS's decision was based on her pregnancy or that she was treated differently than a similarly situated co-worker. Furthermore, UPS argued it had no obligation to offer Young accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act because Young's pregnancy did not constitute a disability. The district court dismissed Young's claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question: Does the Pregnancy Discrimination Act require an employer to provide the same work accommodations to an employee with pregnancy-related work limitations as to employees with similar, but non-pregnancy related, work limitations? Conclusion: No, but courts must evaluate the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than non-pregnant workers with similar inabilities to work and determine whether there are any legitimate reasons for such differences. Justice Stephen G. Breyer delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that an interpretation of the Act that requires employers to offer the same accommodations to pregnant workers as all others with comparable physical limitations regardless of other factors would be too broad. There is no evidence that Congress intended the Act to grant pregnancy such an unconditional “most-favored-nation status.” However, Congress clearly intended the Act to do more than defining sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. The Court held that a plaintiff may show that she faced disparate treatment from her employer according to the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , which requires evidence that the employer’s actions were more likely than not based on discriminatory motivation, and that any reasons the employer offered were pretextual. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the language of the Act makes employers liable for discriminatory conduct regardless of intent. To determine whether the conduct was discriminatory, Justice Alito argued that the treatment of pregnant employees should be compared to the treatment of non-pregnant employees in similar jobs with similar abilities and inabilities to work. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Act only prohibited an employer from distinguishing between employees of similar abilities and inabilities because of pregnancy, while differing treatment for other reasons is permissible. To adopt a broader reading of the Act’s protections would entitle pregnant workers to every possible accommodation. Justice Scalia also argued that the Act’s main intent is to clarify that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Kennedy wrote that the majority opinion interpreted the Act in a manner that conflates evidence of disparate impact with that of disparate treatment, which creates unnecessary confusion in litigating pregnancy discrimination cases. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/12-1226 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:16:12 Section 3: 00:27:22 Section 4: 00:57:31 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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Lozman v. Riviera Beach: Oral Argument - October 01, 2012
 
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Facts: In 2002, Fane Lozman purchased a floating residential structure. The structure was rectangular and made of plywood. It contained no bilge pumps, no raked bow, no navigation aids, no lifeboats, no propulsion mechanism, no steering, and cleats, which were inappropriate for towing. Lozman kept his floating home in a marina in the City of Riviera Beach. Lozman signed a lease with the city, moored the floating home to the dock, and affixed the home to land based utilities. Later, the city council passed a revised dockage agreement and accompanying Marina Rules. Pursuant to these rules, the city informed Lozman it would revoke his permission to remain on the Marina unless he executed a new agreement and complied with the new regulations. Lozman did not execute a new agreement and continued to remain at the marina. In response, the city filed an in rem suit in federal court for trespass under federal maritime law. The city filed for partial summary judgment on its trespass claim. Lozman argued that his floating home was not a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, and therefore not subject to maritime law. The district court granted the city's motion and held that Lozman's floating home was a "vessel" for purposes admiralty jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the lower court, and Lozman appealed the appellate court's determination that his floating home was a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3. Question: Is a floating structure a "vessel" under 1 U.S.C. § 3, thus triggering federal maritime jurisdiction, if that structure is indefinitely moored, receives power and other utilities from shore, and is not intended to be used in maritime transportation or commerce? Conclusion: No. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the 11th Circuit's definition of "vessel" is too broad. The Cort focused on the language of the statute, which states that a vessel is "capable of being used...as a means of transportation." While the floating home can move, it is not used for transportation in a practical way. The Court employed a "reasonable observer" test, holding that something's ability to float, does not automatically make it a vessel. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the reasonable observer test introduces a subjective element that upsets long established maritime precedent. The dissent would also remand the case to develop the record further. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy joined in the dissent. For more information about this case see: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/11-626 Section 1: 00:00:05 Section 2: 00:17:28 Section 3: 00:27:43 Section 4: 00:56:17 PuppyJusticeAutomated videos are created by a program written by Adam Schwalm. This program is available on github here: https://github.com/ALSchwalm/PuppyJusticeAutomated The audio and transcript used in this video is provided by the Chicago-Kent College of Law under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. See this link for details: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
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